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This paper is a response to the question asked by Tony Ghaye in Reflective Practice
Volume 8, Number 2, 2007, ‘Is reflective practice ethical?’. My response is to re-
consider the pervasive idea in reflective practice that experience is always private and
personal. This common understanding of experience leads to a reluctance when writing
for the purpose of assessment and to a type of writing that tends towards the
confessional. Contrary to that notion of experience, I suggest that a return to Charles
Sanders Peirce enables the acknowledgement that experience is not personally owned
but rather a conversation between the self and that which is not-yet known. This
conversation is precipitated by the element of surprise, thus making the study of surprise
a central feature of reflective practice. This argument is illustrated through examining a
dramatic moment in Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophical novel Thus spake Zarathustra
(1887) in which Zarathustra’s teaching techniques are challenged and rendered different.
Eschewing the belief that experience is ‘personal’ offers a version of reflective practice
as the attempt to continually engage in conversations precipitated by the Other.
Keywords: ethics; experience; literature; reflective practice
Introduction
Recently Tony Ghaye (2007) raised an important question, and invited conversation which
addressed it: ‘Is reflective practice ethical?’ (p. 151). In responding to Ghaye’s heartfelt and
important question I argue that to discuss ethics in reflective practice demands a reconsid-
eration of the notion of experience. A pervasive view held in the discourse of reflective
practice is that experience is something quite personal for the individual. Thus, it is often
with great reluctance that experience is written about for assessment purposes. Nonetheless,
because reflective practice promises ‘improvement’, the demand to write is expected to be
met, which results in a writing that tends towards a ‘confessional mode’ (Pillow, 2003).
Contrary to a ‘personal’ notion of experience, I suggest that a return to Charles Sanders
Peirce enables the acknowledgement that experience is not personally owned but rather a
conversation between the self and that which is not yet known; a conversation that forces
modifications to actions. This conversation is precipitated by the element of surprise, thus
making the study of surprise a central feature of reflective practice. The aim is to move
reflective practice from being a mode of knowledge that can improve the individual and
towards a study of the techniques of teaching deployed both prior to and after surprise. This
argument is illustrated through examining a dramatic moment in Friedrich Nietzsche’s
(1887/2006) philosophical novel Thus spake Zarathustra in which Zarathustra’s teaching
techniques are challenged and rendered different. Eschewing the belief that experience is
‘personal’ offers a version of reflective practice as the attempt to continually engage in
conversations precipitated by the other.
*Email: vikki.pollard@education.monash.edu.au
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400  V. Pollard
The ‘experience’ of reflective practice
Those in teacher education will be aware that reflective practice has been instated as ‘one of
the dominant policy doctrines in teacher-education’ (Erlandson, 2005, p. 661, cf. Huberman,
1996; Kinsella, 2007; McWilliam, 1994). However, despite its pervasiveness, ‘there contin-
ues to be tremendous conceptual and practical confusion surrounding what reflective practice
is and in what ways it is distinct from other modes of reflective theorising’ (Kinsella, 2007,
p. 395). This paper hopes to contribute to a conceptual understanding of reflective practice
by re-examining the notion of experience. To be brief, reflective practice is generally set as
a task for pre-service teachers in order that they ‘improve’ as teachers. As such, it demands
the study of one’s experiences in the classroom. Pre-service teachers are asked to objectify
their experiences in order to ‘improve’. The aim of improvement through reflection was
bequeathed to education from the Enlightenment ‘Sapere aude! “Have courage to use your
own reason!” – that is the motto of enlightenment’ (Kant, 1784/1995, p. 1). The individual
human was expected to find the courage to face themselves so as to free themselves from
unreflective action. ‘If I have a book which understands for me, a pastor who has a conscience
for me, a physician who decides my diet, and so forth, I need not trouble myself. I need not
think … others will readily undertake the irksome work for me’ (Kant, 1784/1995). As a
discourse, reflective practice has taken up this aim.
When in a critical mode reflective practitioners acknowledge that this takes ‘courage’
and have asked questions about the ethicality of demanding that students objectify their
experiences. In particular, Tony Ghaye (2007) asked if it is ethical to demand that students
reveal their personal experiences. To illustrate the dilemma and difficultly of doing this
Ghaye presented an example from a nursing student’s essay. The student wrote: 
I don’t know my lecturers or personal tutor immediately. What right has anyone to ask for such
personal information, let alone ask that it be graded by a faceless lecturer? As nurses we respect
patient’s rights not to disclose personal feelings. Yet no such right is afforded to students. I
have had reflections returned with requests for more details about my feelings. I comply but
deeply resent being asked to do so. (Sinclair-Penwarden, quoted in Ghaye, 2007, p. 152)
It is the demand for ‘more’ about ‘feelings’ that troubles Ghaye and forces that ethics be
considered. In a similar vein, Valerie Hobbs (2007) reported that as an undergraduate she
was uncomfortable being asked to write a reflective journal about her family’s history of
racism. ‘Aside from the fact that I was unpractised in such an exercise, the idea that my
professor, whom I had only just met, would be reading my thoughts on extremely personal
matters discouraged any genuine self-examination’ (p. 405, emphasis added). Hobbs felt
constrained, which was revealed in her writing. She was told that her ‘reflections were
superficial and guarded’ (Hobbs, 2007), a comment Hobbs argued her fellow students also
commonly received. Like Ghaye, I also argue that the teachers of teachers ought not to shy
away from encouraging and practising reflection as a way of knowing about teaching.
However, what needs to be addressed is the notion of experience deployed in reflective
practice because this notion grounds ethics and the notion which currently dominates reflec-
tive practice is ethically inadequate.
The dominant understanding of experience evidenced in reflective practice is that of
experiences as something belonging to the individual. Writing of such a view, Teresa de
Lauretis (1984) argued that it is an ‘individualistic, idiosyncratic sense of something
belonging to one and exclusively her own even though others might have “similar” experi-
ences’ (de Lauretis, 1984, p. 159). This view is common within the discourse of reflective
practice. For example, Hobbs (2007) argued that the teacher researcher is required to
engage in ‘genuine self-examination’ (p. 405), to reach deeply into experiences and draw
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Reflective Practice  401
forth genuine kernels of truth to change behaviour for the better. ‘In order to progress, then,
teachers and teachers-in-training, in particular, must voice, confront and evaluate …
beliefs’ (Hobbs, 2007, p. 406).The belief that experience is owned by a particular individual
can also be discerned through the use of metaphors of depth. Hobbs (2007) argued that the
aim of reflective practice is ‘to delve into teacher’s cognition’.
Reflective practice can be said to be suffering from the belief that experience is personally
owned. This results in a very particular mode of writing, one that Wanda Pillow (2003)
referred to as ‘confessional’. This is a mode of writing that seeks to render ‘the research and
the research subject as more familiar to each other (and thus to the reader)’ (Pillow, 2003,
p. 184). The writing itself is cathartic, as it provides a deep sense of knowledge and a relief
from the tensions of delving. Pillow argued that the attempt at familiarity provides the
‘researcher with a form of self-reflexivity as confession that often yields a catharsis of self-
awareness’ (p. 181). Texts written upon this basis are difficult to critique because they are
believed to be the personal truth as experienced by the researcher. 
It is interesting that such texts, which engage in personal self-reflexivity that is rendered as self-
knowledge and truth, are often difficult to discuss and critique because to do so feels like an
attack on the author. Thus, to critique such texts seems crass and unfeeling. (Pillow, 2003, p. 183)
Apart from being difficult to interpret, itself an ethical problem, this type of reflection
aims merely at ‘personal’ improvement of the writer/teacher. Hannah Arendt (1958)
warned against this desire to ‘improve’ people as one might a chair or a car. She called it a
‘delusion’ to believe we can: 
‘make’ something in the realm of human affairs – ‘make’ institutions or laws, for instance, as
we make tables and chairs, or make men ‘better’ or ‘worse’ … the utopian hope that it may be
possible to treat men as one treats other ‘material’. (p. 188)
To aim at ‘improvement’ presupposes that people, like other materials, are a means to an
end. This is not an ethical basis for reflection. How, then, can we ethically ground reflective
practice?
This question can be addressed through a redefinition of the notion of experience. What
is required is less an individualistic notion and one that instead perceives experience as a
dialogue which effects actions. The notion of experience as rendered by Charles Sanders
Peirce can offer such a way of understanding experience. The work of John Dewey, partic-
ularly his book on reflective thinking (Dewey, 1933), is generally positioned as being a
very important source for modern reflective practice in teacher education. Grimmett and
Erickson (1988) claimed ‘the ghost of John Dewey haunts reflective practice’ (p. 6) (cf.
Schön, 1987; Copeland, Birmingham, de la Cruz, & Lewin, 1993). However, the ghost who
haunts Dewey’s work is that of Peirce (cf. Dewey, 1933, 1946). In particular, Peirce’s
notion of experience, essential to which is the element of surprise. The return of this notion
has important ethical implications for reflective practice. The questions to address are then:
how did Peirce understand experience and how did surprise figure in this?
Experience and surprise
During his ‘Harvard lectures on pragmatism’, delivered in 1903, American philosopher and
semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce described a singular pedagogy. 
In all the works of pedagogy I have read, and they have been many, big and heavy, I don’t
remember that any one has advocated a system of teaching by practical jokes, mostly cruel.
That, however, describes the method of our great teacher, Experience. She says, ‘Open you
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402  V. Pollard
mouth and close your eyes, and I will give you something to make you wise’ and thereupon
she keeps her promise and seems to take her pay in the fun of tormenting us. (Peirce, 1960, p. 37)
This childish chant played on by Peirce was rendered differently in my playground. We
said, ‘Open your mouth and close your eyes and I will give you a big surprise’. It is the
element of surprise which is essential to Peirce’s notion of experience.
Peirce was a phenomenologist who described experience as having a particular struc-
ture. According to Anne Freadman (2004), Peirce attempted to describe ‘all the features
that are common to whatever is experience’ (Peirce, quoted in Freadman, 2004, p. 69,
original emphasis). Peirce did not perceive experience as something personal but rather as
a phenomenon made up of particular temporal elements. His aim was to study the ‘nature
of experience’ (Freadman, 2004). Peirce discerned three elements common to experience.
He called these ‘present-ness’, ‘struggle’ and ‘law’. In this paper I focus on the second
element, struggle, as this element foregrounds experiences as always difficult and always
estranging. This displaces the idea that experience is something through which the individ-
ual can come to know themselves better. This fundamentally alters the depth metaphor of
experience and reflection because it makes known that experience undoes the self rather
than sustains it. An experience tears away at belief systems and thus forces new actions.
Phenomena intrude upon belief systems and render them different. Peirce called these
‘forcible modification of our ways of thinking, the influence of the world or experience’
(Peirce, 1955, p. 88, original emphasis). It is ‘the absolute constraint upon us to think
otherwise than we have been thinking that constitutes experience’ (Peirce, 1955, p. 89).
However, this demand to think otherwise only occurs through surprise.
The element of surprise is essential to learning. Peirce wrote of the moment of surprise. 
Your mind was filled [with] an imaginary object that was expected. At the moment when it was
expected the vividness of the representation is exalted, and suddenly, when it should come
something quite different comes instead. (Peirce, 1960, p. 38)
The moment of surprise reveals what Peirce called a ‘double consciousness’: 
I ask you whether at that instant of surprise there is not a double consciousness, on the one hand
an Ego, which is simply the expected idea suddenly broken off, on the other hand the Non-Ego,
which is the strange intruder in his abrupt entrance. (Peirce, 1960, p. 38)
Experience starts with an encounter with strangeness. It is an event between belief and a
‘strange intruder’; ‘The kind of thing to which the word “experience” is more particularly
applied – is an event’ (Peirce, 1955, p. 88). Peirce understood that this was traumatic and
argued that humans tend to avoid the event of experience. ‘Instead of waiting for experi-
ences to come at untoward times, he provokes it when it can do no harm’ (1955, p. 88).
Nonetheless, these events do occur, and, as occurrences, forcibly modify beliefs.
This understanding of experience as an event forced upon beliefs fundamentally alters
the notion of the individual, which can no longer be seen as stable and coherent and rationally
able to guide their own ‘improvement’. The individual, or self, becomes instead the site of
a conversation. In his book on Peirce’s notion of the self Vincent Colapietro (1989) argued
that the self is ‘someone through whom others speak. … The subject is, among other things,
a medium through which forces and persons other than the subject speak’ (p. 38, original
emphasis). The self is the result of conversations between beliefs which inform actions and
the ‘strange intruder’. Drawing from Peirce’s work, de Lauretis (1994) defined experience
‘as a complex of habits, dispositions, associations, perceptions, and expectations resulting
from the continuous … interaction of the self’s “inner world” with the “outer world”’
(p. 298). Thus, the sense of self requires: (1) beliefs and their accompanying habits; (2) a
conversation with a strange intruder; (3) a forcible change to beliefs via this conversation.
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Reflective Practice  403
In summary, experience is an event which forcibly interrupts stable truths and forces
changes to habits. Peirce called this ‘habit change’ ‘a modification of a person’s tendencies
toward action, resulting from previous experiences or from previous exertions’ (Peirce,
quoted in de Lauretis, 1994, p. 300). It is habit change that reflective practice can attempt
to effect. Such a change of habit is ethical because it is based on a dialogue. It refuses to see
the individual as the cause of their own destiny and instead places the ‘strange intruder’ as
essential to change. I believe this is what Ghaye (2007) was referring to when he argued for
a reflective practice ‘which recognises uncertainty, ambivalence and messiness. Additionally
an approach which describes ethical relationships based upon respect for the Other’ (p. 158).
The notion of experience as ‘personal’ does not offer a grounding for an ethics of the
other, as it is individualistic and does not acknowledge the place of the other, or ‘strange
intruder’, within experience. The ‘improvement’ to the self which results in a personalized
reflective practice is seen as primarily the work of the individual. The other is eclipsed.
Peirce’s notion of experience, however, makes the other essential to understanding acquired
habits and to changing these habits. It is habit change that reflective practice can aim for,
rather than ‘improvement’ to the individual. These habits would be the result of a dialogue
and, most importantly, are always open to be changed again.
However, this evocation of a different way of understanding experience is insufficient
to thinking about the difficulty of reflective practice for pre-service teachers. What are
required are examples of reflection upon the type of experience defined by Peirce. What is
needed is an example of a conversation between practices and beliefs and a ‘strange
intruder’ which resulted in different techniques of teaching, which are then open to further
interpretation. The invocation of Peirce’s notion of experience is important in reflective
practice not merely because it suggests a way of de-individualizing experience. Peirce is
important as he discerned elements in experience (habits, strangeness, forcing change) that
highlight experience as an event fundamentally disorientating. The realm of the literary
presents such experiences in abundance. It seems logical to turn to this realm in order to
experience how experiences alter habits. In particular, the literary realm of the grotesque
seems particularly suited to providing not only examples of ‘characters’ changed through
experience but examples of how to write about such experiences.
The Russian literary theorist Lev Vygotsky (1926/1992) was among the first to recog-
nize the importance of the strange in education and to relate it to a particular type of
aesthetic. He argued in Educational psychology that education is a process which attempts
to draw the learner ‘out from himself’ (p. 16) in order to produce ‘new forms of activity’
(p. 11). Vygotsky called this change in thinking ‘the aesthetic of the grotesque’. 
German aesthetics has long referred to this psychological aspect of art as the aesthetic of the
grotesque, and through these examples demonstrated with extraordinary persuasiveness the
dialectical character of aesthetic experience. Contradiction, alienation, transcendence, triumph
– these are all essential constituents of the aesthetic event. (Vygotsky, 1926/1992, p. 16)
It is for this reason that I turn to the realm of the grotesque in order to provide a literary
illustration of changes to teaching which resulted from experience as defined by Peirce.
From this example I hope to show not only how such an experience might occur but also
the possibilities for writing about such an experience.
The literary grotesque
The literary grotesque is defined as that in which change occurs due to experiences which
surprise long held beliefs. Wolfgang Kayser (1957), in his well-known study of the
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404  V. Pollard
grotesque, concluded that it is a realm ruled by ‘suddenness and surprise’ (p. 184). Richard
Pearce (1970), in his book Stages of the clown, emphasized the disorder and uncertainty in
the grotesque. 
The grotesque differs from other forms of art in that it does not leave us with a sense of order
or peace. And many modern writers, sensing or believing that this kind of peace is a lie, have
revived the Grotesque as their mode of apprehending, representing, and exploring reality.
Rather than dispel contradiction or make it bearable, they attempt to reveal it in its fullness.
(Pearce, 1970, p. 143)
This definition is reminiscent of Donald Schön’s (1987) characterization of teaching in
Educating the reflective practitioner. He argued that teaching operates in ‘the swampy
lowland of messy, confusing problems [that] defy technical solution’ (p. 3). The grotesque
is a realm that does not provide ready answers and solutions. In short, the grotesque
provides an experience that ‘mocks and challenges a restricted point of view’ (Di Renzo,
1993, p. 3). In the realm of the grotesque, ideas, norms and habits are challenged by strange
intruders. As such, the grotesque in many ways liberates thought.
This realm, as foreshadowed by Vygotsky, has potential for education. In particular, the
figure of the fool, often met with in the grotesque, has been deployed as a way of challenging
beliefs in education. Tim McDonough (2001) argued that the rhetoric of the fool ‘allows for
a … movement in thought’ (p. 107). The fool invites reflection. The rhetoric of the fool: 
demands an indirect form which encourages the interlocutor to engage in a reflexive movement
that not only forces the gaze of the interlocutor back upon herself but is doubly reflexive in that
it forces the interlocutor to reflect upon the consequences of her efforts to communicate her
subjective knowledge in relation to others. (p. 108)
Through producing a surprise, the fool forces reflection upon knowledge and habits. It is for
this reason that I have chosen a particular scene from Nietzsche’s Thus spake Zarathustra
in which a fool forces Zarathustra to change his habits of teaching. The experience had by
Zarathustra is not presented as a ‘personal’ and thus taboo subject, but resonates with
Peirce’s view of experience. The surprise of the other forces a conversation which forces
habit change. This is an ethical change because the other was not eclipsed but rather a force
which demanded, and received, critical attention.
The teacher and the jester in Thus spake Zarathustra
Thus spake Zarathustra is the tale of a teacher learning how to teach. Zarathustra claims
himself as a teacher throughout the text. His aim is to ‘teach the overman’ (Nietzsche, 2006,
p. 5). That is, he desires to teach humanity how to learn to become creators of new values.
In order to become a teacher of new values Zarathustra must first undergo three metamor-
phoses; from ‘camel to lion to child’ (Nietzsche, 1887/2006, p. 16). These transformations
are as much transformations in Zarathustra as they are transformations of his teaching prac-
tice. He must first learn how to teach differently before he can ‘teach the overman’. It is his
first transformation, from camel to lion, that I wish to focus on because it is a transformation
forced upon Zarathustra by a fool.
The transformation occurs after Zarathustra has descended from his mountain in order
to teach. He enters a marketplace where he finds a large crowd gathered to watch the perfor-
mance of a tightrope walker. Zarathustra begins to deliver his message to the crowd. His
teaching at this point is easily recognized as quite traditional. He attempts to lecture the
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Reflective Practice  405
audience on his new principles. The role of the audience is merely to listen and accept. This
is a style of teaching Shoshanna Felman (1982) referred to as a ‘pedagogical pose of mastery
[with its] image of the self-sufficient, self-possessed proprietor of knowledge’ (p. 34).
The crowd is quickly bored with the lecture and demands the tightrope walker they
mistakenly believe Zarathustra is announcing. The walker also believes Zarathustra is
introducing him and begins his performance. Zarathustra does not tell the crowd that they
are wrong, but instead attempts to turn the performance of the tightrope walker into an
illustration of his message. He continues lecturing the crowd and becomes more and more
despondent and self-pitying. ‘They do not understand me: I am not the mouth for these
ears’ (Nietzsche, 1887/2006, p. 9). Zarathustra seems overwhelmed by self-pity and ready
to give up his teaching.
It is at this fateful moment that the jester appears. When the tightrope walker, oblivious
to the turmoil below, ‘reached the exact middle of his course’ (Nietzsche, 1887/2006, p. 11)
a door opened in the tower the rope is strung from and ‘a colourful fellow resembling a
jester’ appeared. With a cry he jumped onto the rope and began to follow the tightrope
walker, mercilessly teasing him. The jeering crowd is silenced by this appearance. When the
jester reached the tightrope walker he ‘uttered a devilish cry and jumped over the man who
stood in his way’ (p. 11). The tightrope walker falls, the crowd parts and he lands at
Zarathustra’s side. Before he dies he recovers consciousness enough to tell Zarathustra that
he knew ‘the devil would trip me’ (p. 11).
After the crowd leaves Zarathustra, ‘lost in thought, forgetting the time’ (Nietzsche,
1887/2006, p. 12), sat for hours next to the body of the dead man pondering how a jester
‘can become man’s fatality’. Zarathustra, however, is not deterred from his desire to teach
and resolves to continue to attempt to ‘teach men the meaning of their existence. … But I
am still far from them, and my sense does not speak to their senses’ (p. 12). Zarathustra
hoists the dead man onto his shoulders as a burden he must carry away. Gooding-Williams
(2001), in his definitive text on Zarathustra, argued that in this phase Zarathustra is still in
the first metamorphosis, the camel (cf. p. 94).
As Zarathustra is leaving the marketplace he is again confronted by the jester, who
sneaks up and whispers to him to leave town because he is hated by too many, even those
who may be sympathetic to his teaching. The jester claims that he did not hurt Zarathustra
because ‘you talked like a jester’ (Nietzsche, 1887/2006, p. 12). But he must leave town or
‘tomorrow I shall leap over you, one living over one dead. And when he said this the
man vanished’ (p. 13). After this final confrontation Zarathustra goes to a forest and sleeps
for an inordinate amount of time. Upon waking he ‘looks into himself’: ‘Zarathustra looked
into the woods and the silence, amazed, he looked into himself. Then he stood up quickly,
like a seafarer who all at once sees land, and he rejoiced, for he saw a new truth’ (p. 14).
Gooding-Williams (2001) described this as the moment of the ‘second metamorphosis of
the spirit’ (p. 95). Zarathustra becomes the lion, a defiant spirit, and this transformation
produces a change in his habit of teaching. He resolves to forget lecturing to a crowd and
instead seeks for companions. ‘Living companions I need, who follow me because they
want to follow themselves – wherever I want. … To lure many away from the herd, for that
I have come’ (Nietzsche, 1887/2006, p. 14). In his new tone of defiance Zarathustra uncon-
sciously invokes the jester by saying: ‘I want to go to my goal, and I go my own way; over
the hesitating and dawdling I shall leap’ (p. 15). The leap of the jester is the surprise which
forces Zarathustra to transform his teaching. The content of that new teaching style is not
particularly relevant for this paper, not the least because it alters again before the end of the
novel. What is important is that Zarathustra reflected upon his encounter with the jester and
change was forced upon him. The experience forced upon Zarathustra by the jester is
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406  V. Pollard
traumatic. As is the process of reflection. Nonetheless, it is essential to changing Zarathus-
tra’s habits as a teacher.
In conclusion
The notion of experience dominating reflective practice maintains that experiences are
‘personal’ and that writing about them in reflective essays can improve the teacher.
Reflective practice in this sense is little more than an attempt at personal development.
This is unethical because it excludes the influence of the ‘strange intruder’. Peirce’s
notion of experience, however, can ground ethical considerations because it acknowl-
edges that the self is none other than that which results from a conversation with the
other, the strange intruder. This conversation forces changes to habits or techniques. In
adopting this notion of experience, reflective practice can become a process which studies
the moment in which the intruder surprises habits of teaching. Thus spake Zarathustra
offers once such moment of reflection. The aim of such a reflective practice is not simply
a means to personal ‘improvement’ but rather a reflection upon the conversation with the
other and an examination of the techniques used prior to the conversation and the tech-
niques which develop out of this conversation. It is this conception of reflective practice
that I believe can not only address issue of ethics but can open reflective practice to
different ways of writing. As Tony Ghaye (2007) argued, such texts recognize uncer-
tainty, ambivalence and messiness and acknowledge reflective practice as a continuing
dialogue with the other.
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